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Abstract 
In this paper, we investigate the role of formal and relational contracts in managing alliance 
risks that arise in co-opetitive collaborations. We undertake a case study of a co-opetitive sales 
alliance within the independent publishing sector, incorporating data from all firms to the 
alliance. We provide empirical evidence of the relational risks of misappropriation and 
opportunism as manifest in both vertical (buyer-supplier) and horizontal activities within the 
alliance and identify a further relational risk relating to concerns of introducing homogeneity 
into the product offerings of firms.  We also examine the nature of compliance and regulatory 
risk, which is salient in this setting given the potential for anti-competitive behaviour towards 
customers and suppliers. We find that the firms mitigate alliance risks primarily through the 
use of relational contracts (informal self-enforcing agreements). Formal contracts are evident 
in the buyer-supplier relationship, but are used mainly for ex post co-ordination. We adopt an 
organisational economics perspective to explain the specific mechanisms that support 
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relational contracting between the firms. We find that shared values, implicit understandings, 
restricted membership, meetings, and collective sanctions encourage the firms to demonstrate 
commitment to the alliance, to diffuse information about partners’ behaviours, and, crucially, 
to monitor partners. Informal agreements between partners are sustained by self-regulating 
behaviours, reinforced by the ‘shadow of the future’ in that firms have a great deal to gain from 
continued participation in the alliance and face losses if excluded. Notably, our findings support 
economic arguments that trust is a weak proxy for observable control mechanisms. Our study 
contributes to knowledge of the management of inter-firm risks in two significant ways. First, 
we draw on our empirical findings to develop an organising framework that presents a means 
of systematically investigating the mechanisms and factors that support the use of relational 
contracts. Second, by employing an economics approach to the management of alliance risks, 
we are able to present a richer and potentially more compelling view of inter-firm control than 
is traditionally presented in studies that rely on intra-firm notions of social controls, in 
particular trust. 
Keywords: inter-organisational relationships, co-opetition, formal contracts, relational 
contracting, social controls, trust, enlightened self-interest. 
Data Availability: We cannot make public the data used in this study due to confidentiality 
agreements with participating firms. 
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Relational Contracting and the Myth of Trust: Control in a Co-opetitive Setting 
1 Introduction 
Collaborative relationships between competitors increasingly define the business landscape, spanning 
a range of industries (Bengtsson, Eriksson & Wincent, 2010; Thomason, Simendinger & Kiernan, 
2013). In this study, we focus on the control of co-opetitive alliances, a specific, complex, form of 
collaboration between competitors. Engaging in co-opetitive activity entails “competing without having 
to kill the opposition and co-operation without having to ignore self-interest” (Brandenburger & 
Nalebuff, 1996:4).  Firms must protect and further their own competitive position, potentially at the 
expense of their partners, while concurrently combining resources in a joint effort to achieve a common 
goal and share in the resultant benefits (Czakon, Mucha-Kus & Rogalski, 2014; Gnyawali & Madhavan, 
2001). Despite evidence that alliances between competitors are more likely to fail than those between 
non-competing partners (Park and Russo, 1996), and despite calls to extend management accounting 
and control studies of inter-firm relationships beyond buyer-supplier exchanges (Caglio & Ditillo, 
2008), co-opetitive alliances remain under-examined.  
In this study we investigate the use of formal and relational contracting to manage alliance risks in co-
opetitive settings. Extant literature has focused extensively on formal contracts, despite evidence that 
these are often incomplete and that other mechanisms are employed to manage inter-firm relations 
(Anderson & Dekker, 2014). Informal self-enforcing agreements between firms (relational contracts) 
rely on a range of social and other relationship-based control mechanisms and are sustained by the 
expected value of the future relationship (Baker, Gibbons & Murphy, 2002; Williamson, 1979). The 
literature is equivocal as to whether relational contracts are substitutes or complements for formal 
contracts, although the relation between them appears to be context specific (Cao & Lumineau, 2015). 
While the notion of relational contracting has been considered extensively in the management and 
economics literatures there is little empirical evidence of its role in managing alliance risks (for recent 
exceptions, see Neumann, 2010; Windolph & Moeller, 2012). Furthermore, it remains under-
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conceptualised (Cao & Lumineau, 2015; Schepker, Oh, Martynov & Poppo, 2014), and under-
researched, with most studies focussing predominantly on the use of social controls for relational 
contracting (for example, Dekker, 2004; Neumann, 2010). Social controls, commonly captured in these 
studies through notions of shared values and trust, represent one aspect of relational contracting (Jones 
et al, 1997), and hence offer only a partial explanation of the governance arrangements between alliance 
partners. By extending the notion of relational contracting beyond the use of social controls, we thus 
address recent concerns in the management control literature about the use of intra-firm concepts in the 
study of inter-firm relationships (cf. Caglio & Ditillo, 2008; Dekker, 2015). 
Broadly similar conceptualisations of relational contracting are evident in both the management and 
economics-based literatures, but they differ significantly in one particular respect. While the 
management literature relies heavily on trust-based constructs to explain relational contracting, 
organisational economic theory contends that the concept of ‘trust’ offers a largely impoverished 
explanation of the nature of relationships between firms (cf. Chaserant, 2003; Williamson, 1993). 
Economic exchanges require safeguards to protect investments from opportunistic others; employing 
the concept of ‘trust’ obscures the nature, use, and rationale underpinning such protection (Williamson, 
1993). In economic terms, mechanisms used to manage alliance risk lead to ex post labelling of trust 
(Barney et al, 1994); it is these mechanisms that must be carefully identified in order to understand 
better the nature of inter-firm control. Trust is thus regarded in the study of inter-firm relations as an 
inappropriate and weak proxy for observable mechanisms of control.  First introduced into management 
control research by Tomkins in 2001, the concept of trust as an analytical device to explain inter-firm 
relations remains unchallenged in the management control literature. The current study, with its focus 
on a broad conceptualisation of relational contracting, therefore provides an opportunity to investigate 
inter-firm exchanges through an economics lens, rather than from the narrow management perspective 
traditionally adopted in the control literature.   
We pay particular attention to specific alliance risks that formal and relational contracts are designed to 
mitigate in a co-opetitive setting (cf. Caglio & Ditillo, 2008), moving beyond the traditional use of 
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transaction characteristics (asset specificity, uncertainty, and frequency) as proxies for such risks.  
Anderson, Christ, Dekker, and Sedatole (2015) argue that the use of transaction characteristics as 
proxies for risk emphasises risk at the level of the transaction at the expense of broader risks within the 
totality of the alliance.  
We undertake a case study of a co-opetitive alliance within the independent publishing sector in the 
United Kingdom, drawing on interview data collected from all partners to the alliance. We thus respond 
to calls for more field research in this area in order to provide contextual richness to our current 
understanding of relational contracts (Cao & Lumineau, 2015). Our study investigates a complex setting 
involving the governance of both buyer-supplier (vertical) and horizontal activities between competing 
partners.  This co-opetitive context is characterised by a non-equity based relationship and the absence 
of a super-ordinate governing authority.  Our setting allows us to consider how alliance type, beyond 
the more frequently researched dyadic buyer-supplier context, influences the risks that arise and the 
subsequent control mechanisms employed to mitigate these risks (cf. Anderson, Christ, Dekker & 
Sedatole, 2014; Cao & Lumineau, 2015; Caglio & Ditillo, 2008; Dekker, 2015). We also examine the 
interplay between relational and formal contracting in managing these risks (Cau & Lumineau, 2015). 
We focus primarily on the relational risks within the alliance given that joint activity between 
competitors is argued to offer greater incentives and potential for opportunism (Park & Russo, 1996; 
Tidström, 2014).1  We find evidence of wide-ranging appropriation concerns within the alliance, 
consistent with this view.  However, we also find that the value of the alliance to each firm reduces their 
motivation to engage in such behaviours. Each firm’s motivation to act opportunistically is further 
tempered by the ability of their partners to better identify such opportunistic behaviours. We also 
identify a type of relational risk unique to co-opetitive alliances, not previously identified in the 
literature, that we refer to as the risk of homogeneity in firm identity and product offering.  This risk 
                                                     
1 Performance risk, the risk that collaborative efforts are unsuccessful despite full co-operation between parties, 
is another crucial matter for inter-firm relationships (Das & Teng, 2001; Langfield-Smith, 2008; Schreiner et al., 
2009). We do not focus on the performance risk, or the risk of ‘co-ordination failures’ in this study. We do 
however, highlight pertinent co-ordination concerns and responses in the presentation and discussion of our 
findings. 
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arises from unwitting imitation between competitors as they share information and engage in other inter-
firm exchanges.  Finally, we highlight the salience of regulatory risk, in the co-opetitive setting.  
Regulatory risk arises because competing partners must avoid both actual and perceived anti-
competitive behaviour.   
The firms in our study manage the alliance risks inherent in co-opetitive relationships through a 
combination of formal and relational contracting.  We find that formal contracts manage the buyer-
supplier relationship between partners to the alliance.  However, these are used mainly for ex post co-
ordination of these vertical activities between firms (i.e. to manage the performance rather than the 
relational risks of the alliance). While the formal contracts do include measurable targets, we find that 
attainment of these targets is regarded by the purchasing partners as secondary to sustaining the alliance. 
This is consistent with the inclusion of formal contracts prepared for the management of buyer-supplier 
activities to indirectly mitigate alliance risks associated with the horizontal activities of the alliance we 
study.  To this end, formal contracts address regulatory risk by addressing perceptions of anti-
competitive practices and ensuring compliance with relevant legislation.   
The governance of the alliance relies heavily on relational contracting.  Specifically, the firms in our 
study make extensive use of shared values, group norms, meetings and informal gatherings, partner 
selection, restricted access (number of partners to the alliance), and the threat of collective sanctions to 
manage various relational risks associated with the co-opetitive alliance. Relational contracting 
establishes credible commitments between firms. Firms act according to principles of ‘enlightened self-
interest’, in that they have a great deal to gain from continued participation in a range of collaborations 
and face potentially significant losses if excluded. Furthermore, by co-operating with a select group of 
firms who share similar knowledge and expertise, firms are aware that their partners can readily identify 
behaviours that run counter to the norms of the alliance and adjust their behaviours accordingly. We 
therefore demonstrate the critical role of self-regulating behaviour by firms in governing and sustaining 
the alliance.  Our findings also indicate that relational contracting can substitute for formal contracting 
in managing alliance risks in a co-opetitive setting.  However, we find that the choice of relational 
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contracting in this setting is influenced by the existence of social ties and shared values that pre-date 
formal contracts and the preferences of alliance partners for informal agreements. Finally, the use of 
relational contracting in the sales alliance is not unique to the collaborative activities we study; we find 
it extends to other alliances across the value chain in which the same partners are involved.  This 
suggests that relational contracts need not be re-developed or re-negotiated when new alliances are 
forged between partners. 
Our study contributes to the literature in a number of ways.  First, we document specific alliance risks 
(control problems) evident in co-opetitive exchange. By moving beyond transaction characteristics as 
proxies for such risks we are able to demonstrate the range of control problems that manifest in a co-
opetitive context.  Typically, it is claimed that control problems, in particular relational risks, are likely 
to be ‘more acute’ in co-opetitive alliances, given that firms are better positioned to identify and 
appropriate resources of value from their partners (Caglio & Ditillo, 2008).  However, our setting 
enables us to demonstrate how firms with an in-depth understanding of their partners’ businesses are 
also better positioned to identify and monitor the opportunities and incentives available to their partners, 
which mitigates opportunistic behaviour in co-opetitive alliances.  Thus, we demonstrate empirically 
the value of studying specific relational risks, beyond the level of the transaction, within an alliance 
(Anderson et al, 2014; Caglio & Ditillo, 2008; Neumann, 2010). Furthermore, our identification of a 
new type of regulatory risk, not previously acknowledged in the literature, demonstrates the importance 
of seeking out novel contexts in which to investigate alliance risks. By moving beyond buyer-supplier 
relationships, we are able to demonstrate how alliance risks manifest in a complex setting involving 
both vertical and horizontal relationships. This provides us with a richer portrayal of the risks faced by 
firms and a more meaningful basis on which to explain the resulting governance mechanisms observed. 
Second, we make several contributions to the empirical literature on relational contracting.  We adopt 
an economic perspective in order to investigate a broad set of relational mechanisms beyond social 
controls. Our approach enables us to explain inter-firm governance in terms of calculative behaviours 
driven by self-interested notions of gains and losses.  Such a perspective provides an alternative and 
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potentially more compelling view of inter-firm governance from that traditionally presented in studies 
that rely on notions of social controls or simply ‘trust’. Our approach enables us to present a richer and 
more comprehensive understanding of relational contracting than is currently evident from empirical 
research.   
We draw on our data to develop a comprehensive organising framework that captures notions of 
relational contracting most frequently included in the literature and structures them into the mechanisms 
of relational contracting that mitigate risks between firms, the factors that sustain the use of these 
mechanisms, and the outcomes of relational contracting. This framework can provide a basis for 
systematic future research into the role of relational contracting in the management of inter-firm 
relations.  We also contribute to the relational contracting literature by demonstrating the use of 
relational contracting across multiple alliances.  We thus demonstrate the value of extending research 
in management control beyond the scope of inter-firm buyer-supplier exchanges to understand the 
salience and potential efficiencies of relational contracting in managing a broader nexus of exchange 
between partners at a network level (Caglio & Ditillo, 2008).   
Third, we address ongoing debates relating to the interplay of formal and relational contracting in inter-
firm relationships.  Recent contributions to these debates acknowledge the importance of context when 
examining the relationship between formal and relational contracting (see Cao & Lumineau, 2015 for 
an overview of this literature).  We demonstrate that relational contracting can substitute for formal 
contracting in a co-opetitive setting.  While this finding contradicts previous findings in complex inter-
firm settings, we explain how this can be understood in the context of how other salient contextual 
factors, including temporal sequencing and preference, influence the nature of the relationship between 
formal and relational contracts.   
In the following sections, we theorise the risks in co-opetitive alliances and the potential for formal and 
relational contracting to control for such risks.  We then describe our study design and provide a brief 
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overview of the independent publishing sector in the United Kingdom.  Finally, we present, and discuss 
the implications of, our empirical findings. 
2 Theoretical Development 
In this section, we first examine the risks inherent to co-opetitive alliances.  We then consider formal 
and relational contracting as potential control solutions to manage these risks and to promote 
simultaneous competitive and co-operative behaviours between alliance partners.  
2.1 Risks in co-opetitive alliances 
Prior research establishes co-operation, appropriation, and co-ordination concerns as the general control 
challenges in inter-organisational contexts (see for example, Caglio & Ditillo, 2008; Dekker, 2004; 
Gulati & Singh, 1998; Mahama, 2006). The challenges of promoting co-operation and mitigating 
appropriation concerns in inter-organisational settings are referred to also as the ‘relational risks’ of 
collaboration (Das & Teng, 1996; Schreiner et al., 2009). Co-operation between firms reflects a joint 
undertaking to interact for mutual benefit (Smith, Carroll & Ashford, 1995) and necessitates a range of 
behaviours, including information sharing, joint problem solving, willingness to adapt to changes, and 
restraint from the use of power (Mahama, 2006). Appropriation concerns arise from the potential for 
transacting partners to behave in opportunistic ways (Dekker, 2004; Gulati & Singh, 1998).  
Collaborating firms must safeguard their investments to the alliance, and secure the appropriation of 
value from the alliance, from these potentially opportunistic others (Dekker, 2004). 
Transaction characteristics (such as asset specificity, uncertainty, and frequency) are typically used to 
proxy for the risks of inter-firm activity (Anderson et al., 2014), despite studies that demonstrate the 
effect of the broader alliance environment and characteristics of the parties to the exchange on alliance 
risks (Caglio & Ditillo, 2012; Van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2000). Anderson et al. (2014) 
argue neglecting the risks of inter-firm activity that arise more broadly presents an incomplete and 
potentially biased perspective of the determinants of control choice.  
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Despite intense interest in co-opetitive activity in the management and economics literatures there are 
few empirical studies that investigate specific alliance risks in this setting or relate them to observed 
control solutions (Fernandez, Le Roy & Gnyawali, 2014).   The potential for opportunism (relational 
risk) within co-opetitive alliances is noted to be of significant concern (Park & Russo, 1996; Tidström, 
2014).  Competitors engaging in co-opetitive activity must co-operate in order to ensure the generation 
of common value for the alliance.  However, there is tension between the goals of co-operation and 
those of each partner (Tidström, 2014).  Firms acting opportunistically may use shared resources for 
private gain, or may delay or withdraw co-operation to the detriment of partners (Khanna, Gulati & 
Nohria, 1998).  Inter-firm exchanges also expose firms to the risk of transferring confidential 
information to competitors (Fernandez et al., 2014; Gnyawali & Park, 2009).  The potential for 
disparities in the division of co-created value amongst partners to co-opetitive alliances is also identified 
as a significant relational risk (Fernandez et al., 2014; Gnyawali, Madhavan, He & Bengtsson, 2012), 
given that the partners share the same competitive goals in the market (Fernandez et al., 2014).  This 
risk may arise from a range of sources, including the actions of potentially opportunistic partners, power 
imbalances between firms, or a firm’s own inability to appropriate value from the alliance. Finally, 
partners may hold divergent strategic interests or goals in co-operating (Fernandez et al., 2014).  Such 
differences may result in disagreements as to resource allocations or hidden agendas in relation to the 
misappropriation of resources from the alliance (Fernandez et al., 2014; Hamel, 1991).   
In addition to the relational risks in co-opetitive alliances proposed within the management and 
economics literatures, Anderson et al. (2014) highlight compliance and regulatory risk as a perceived 
hazard across a range of alliance types.  Compliance and regulatory risk is the risk that a partner to an 
alliance will fail to adhere to either customer requirements, firm policies, or laws and regulations, thus 
exposing all partners within the alliance to legal sanctions (Anderson et al., 2014).2  In co-opetitive 
                                                     
2 Anderson et al. (2014), argue that compliance and regulatory risk is unrelated to both performance and relational 
risks in that it neither stems from co-ordination failures nor reflects and attempt by an alliance partner to unduly 
appropriate resources. 
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contexts we expect that regulatory risk will be particularly salient, stemming from the need to navigate 
anti-competitive legislation.3 
In general, it is argued in the literature that risks in co-opetitive contexts are more acute (Caglio & 
Ditillo, 2008; Fernandez et al., 2014) because a partner who is also a competitor has a better ability to 
identify and assimilate information and resources that are of value to them (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; 
Park & Russo, 1996).  Thus, there is a higher risk of loss to competitive advantage and the potential for 
partners to become stronger competitors (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Fernandez et al., 2014).  Other 
studies, however, suggest an alternative view of alliance risks. Alliances are maintained through 
interdependencies (Das & Teng, 2003). High interdependence between partners is likely to reduce the 
potential for opportunistic behaviour because firms have a disincentive to engage in activities that place 
at risk their ability to extract value from the relationship (Sambasivan, Mohamedd & Leong, 2013). 
Furthermore, repeated exchanges between partners with the potential for a long-term relationship 
reduce the likelihood of short-term opportunism in alliances (Jap & Anderson, 2003; Williamson, 
1993). It is not clear the extent to which these relational factors mitigate the acute nature of risks 
between competing partners. We aim to present rich descriptions of the nature of relational risks in co-
opetitive contexts, allowing fuller investigation of the association between relational risks and control 
solutions employed.   
Research Question 1:  What are the alliance risks in co-opetitive alliances, arising from simultaneous 
co-operative and competitive behaviours between firms? 
We consider next the use of control mechanisms to address alliance risks in co-opetitive settings.  
                                                     
3 We do not attempt to provide an exhaustive review of possible relational risks in this section, rather those that 
the literature identifies as key in co-opetitive contexts.  However, our research design permits other possible 
relational risks to arise during the collection of empirical data. 
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2.2 Control in co-opetitive alliances 
The management control literature is replete with studies that examine the relation between risk and the 
selection of management control mechanisms in inter-firm relationships (see for example: Anderson & 
Dekker, 2005; Dekker, 2004; Emsley & Kidon, 2007; Grafton, Abernethy & Lillis, 2011; van der Meer-
Kooistra & Vosselman, 2000).  However, studies predominantly examine the context of dyadic buyer-
supplier exchanges (Caglio & Ditillo, 2008), and focus heavily on the role of formal contracts for 
control, despite evidence that a wide range of control mechanisms mitigate alliance risks (Anderson, 
Christ, Dekker & Sedatole, 2015; Johansson & Siverbo, 2011). In the management and economics 
literatures, the concept of relational contracts (Macneil, 1974) receives much attention. Studies here 
examine the effectiveness of relational contracts for mitigating exchange risks, such as opportunism, in 
the absence of fiat. They also investigate the interplay between formal and relational contracts for 
effective control.  In the following sections, we consider the role of both formal and relational contracts 
and the interaction between the two in the co-opetitive context.4     
2.2.1 Formal contracts 
Extensive empirical evidence documents the role of formal contracts for the safeguarding of assets and 
minimisation of losses from opportunistic behaviour (see Schepker et al., 2014 for a review) in inter-
firm contexts.  Formal contracts mitigate relational risks by stipulating the responsibilities and 
obligations of each party, contingency adaptations, and legal penalties (Cao & Lumineau, 2015; 
Williamson, 1985).5  Studies also investigate in an inter-firm setting roles for formal contracts beyond 
the control role, such as co-ordination and adaptation (the management of performance risk) (Malhotra 
                                                     
4 We do not consider the separation of the management of competition and the management of co-operation to 
achieve control, whether functionally (i.e. the creation of teams dedicated to either competition or co-operation), 
spatially (i.e. competition in some products or markets and co-operation in others), or via the use of a third-party 
manager (Bengtsson & Kock, 2000).  Nor do we consider the use of equity exchange to align the interests of 
partners (Gulati & Singh, 1998).  Several management accounting studies provide evidence on the effectiveness 
of such approaches for the management of activity between competitors (see for example: Coad & Cullen, 2006; 
Mouritsen & Thrane, 2006; Thrane & Hald, 2006; van der Meer-Kooistra & Scapens, 2008). 
5 In the economics literature, the term ‘formal contracts’ is used to denote a range of formal control mechanisms 
such as performance measures, forms of monitoring and other governance mechanisms (Cau & Luminau, 2015). 
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& Lumineau, 2011; Williamson, 2012).  However, formal contracts are inherently incomplete 
(Williamson, 1979).  Cao and Lumineau (2015) summarise the extant evidence relating to the 
limitations of incomplete contracts: they reduce the legal enforceability; they increase the risk of 
ambiguity and hence increase the scope for opportunistic behaviour; and they are less likely to contain 
adequate contingency clauses that support the flexibility of inter-firm relationships.   
Studies examining the association between increased inter-firm exchange risk and the use of formal 
contracts offer salient insights for the control of co-opetitive alliances, in which risks are argued to be 
more acute.  Most studies find a positive association between risks to inter-firm exchange and the use 
of formal controls.  For example, Burkert, Ivens & Shan (2012) find that in more complex settings, 
formal controls are used more intensively, while Ding, Dekker and Groot (2013) establish that, as risks 
increase in the transaction context, firms place more emphasis on developing more complex (inclusive 
and specific) contracts to manage the collaboration. 
2.2.2 Relational contracts 
Relational contracts, also termed obligational contracts or bilateral governance (Williamson, 1979), are 
informal self-enforcing agreements between firms, sustained by the expected value of the future 
relationship (Baker et al., 2002). ‘The shadow of the future’ (Gibbons & Henderson, 2012: 1350) looms 
over these relationships, encouraging firms to adhere to relational contracts in the self-interested belief 
that they have a great deal to gain from continued participation and face significant losses if excluded 
(Chaserant, 2003; Gibbons & Henderson, 2012).  
Conceptualisations of relational contracting identified across the management control, economics, and 
management literatures include: trust; social relations; implicit understandings between partners; shared 
values and norms; sanctions; restricted membership; partner selection; flexibility; solidarity; 
information exchange; fairness; and informal rules, procedures and structures (Cao & Lumineau, 2015; 
Dekker, 2004; Jones et al, 1997; Poppo, Zhou & Zenger, 2008; Tomkins, 2001; Zhou & Xu, 2012). 
Relational contracting reduces relational risks by safeguarding exchanges between firms. Shared values, 
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group norms, and sanctions establish acceptable behaviours and the consequences of non-conformance, 
while information exchange provides opportunities to monitor partners’ behaviours (Jones et al, 1997; 
Williamson, 1993). Partner selection and restricted access to the alliance reduce the scope and quantity 
of monitoring required of each firm (Jones et al, 1997).  Few empirical studies inform our understanding 
as to how relational contracting may mitigate regulatory risk.  However, Anderson et al. (2014) find 
that compliance and regulatory risk is associated primarily with informal controls, which suggests a 
potentially important role for relational contracting.  
Despite the breadth of concepts theorised in the literature to comprise relational contracting, relatively 
few have received empirical attention.  The majority of studies that operationalise relational contracting 
adopt field or survey methods and use instruments that measure only trust-related concepts to capture 
the construct of relational contracts (Cao & Lumineau, 2015).  Fewer studies examine multiple aspects 
of relational contracting and those that do examine only a small subset (Cao & Lumineau, 2015; 
Schepker et al, 2014). The management and economics literatures are largely in agreement with regard 
to the conceptualisation of relational contracting – with one notable exception. In the management 
literature, trust is argued to engender confidence that transacting partners will not misappropriate 
(Poppo & Zenger, 2002) and to improve the exchange of resources between partners (Morris, Kocak, 
& Özer, 2007; Tidström, 2014; Uzzi, 1996). However, organisational economic approaches adopt a 
very different view of trust. Economic exchanges between parties are fundamentally based on a 
calculated assessment of expected gains and losses; as such, the notion of trust is regarded as an 
inappropriate analytical device for what is more accurately defined as risk-taking with a self-interest 
motive (Williamson, 1993). Firms employ safeguards to protect their investments from opportunistic 
partners and choose to behave in adherence with shared norms for self-interested reasons; employing 
the concept of ‘trust’ to explain economic exchange obscures the nature, use, and rationale underpinning 
such protections (Williamson, 1993).6 As such, trust is not an explanatory tool but rather an ex post 
                                                     
6 Attempts to redefine trust into different categories, such as competency-based, calculative, etc. are regarded in 
the economics literature as, first, distorting the notion of trust and, second, lacking the rationale that underpins 
economic exchanges between firms. The use of trust in the study of economic exchanges is thus regarded as 
suffering from a definitional problem with too many degrees of freedom to be of conceptual value (cf. Williamson, 
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labelling of personal affect (Barney & Hansen, 1994). Thus, what appears to be ‘trust’ in such exchanges 
can more accurately be framed in terms of ‘enlightened self-interest’: a “precarious equilibrium between 
gain seeking and compliance with co-operation norms” (Chaserant, 2003: 172). Enlightened self-
interest encourages firms to self-regulate their behaviour in a compliant manner, thus making them 
appear ‘trustworthy’. “[I[t is redundant at best and can be misleading to use the term "trust" to describe 
commercial exchange for which cost-effective safeguards have been devised in support of more 
efficient exchange….Calculative trust is a contradiction in terms.” (Williamson, 1993: 463).  Repeated 
interactions between firms provide opportunities for partners to develop an understanding of each 
other’s operations, motivations, and likely behaviours (Gibbons & Henderson, 2012). In a co-opetitive 
context, such understandings are likely to be deeper and develop more quickly because partners face 
identical operating conditions and deal with similar suppliers and customers. It is this understanding 
that develops between close partners that enables them to make informal agreements; relabelling this 
as ‘trust’ does not enhance knowledge of relational contracting (Williamson, 1993). 
The different bodies of literature do agree, however, that relational contracting is an important means 
to supress opportunistic behaviour in inter-firm contexts, promoting co-operation in the absence of an 
enforceable contract (Neumann, 2010; Gil, 2009; Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Windolph & Moeller, 2012).  
Firms self-regulate because opportunistic behaviour is itself highly risky and can impact the 
continuation of the exchange relationship.  Sanctions for opportunistic behaviour may result in fewer 
exchanges between parties, the termination of the relationship, and/or exclusion from future business 
opportunities (Carson, Madhok, & Wu, 2006; Chaserant, 2003; Gibbons & Henderson, 2012). The 
threat of sanctions is particularly pertinent in co-opetitive contexts in which reputational concerns may 
harm a firm’s ability to build vital relationships with competitors. 
Relational contracting is a time-consuming and inherently fragile process, reliant on the shared interests 
of partners and their ability to develop implicit understandings (Cao & Lumineau, 2015). Despite this, 
                                                     
1993). However, this debate is largely ignored in the management and management control literatures (see 
Mőllering, 2014 for a recent discussion).  
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in complex inter-firm contexts, where formal contracts can be prohibitively costly to write, relational 
contracting can overcome the need to contractually specify future business needs (Baker et al., 2002; 
Schepker et al., 2014).  Regular communication between partners enables them to understand the basis 
on which promises are made to each other and hence to make realistic, or credible, commitments 
(Gibbons & Henderson, 2012; Williamson, 1993). Credible commitments reflect the calculus of gains 
and losses, but must also offer sufficient flexibility to adapt to unforeseen circumstances (Jones et al, 
1997; Williamson, 2008).  There is little evidence for the association between increased alliance risks 
and the use of relational contracts, but high interdependence and repeated exchanges between partners 
are argued to signal a greater role for relational contracts (Jap & Anderson, 2003; Williamson, 1993). 
2.2.3 Formal and relational contracts as substitutes and complements 
A large number of studies question the relationship between formal and relational contracts for the 
management of alliance risks between firms (see for example Cao & Lumineau, 2015; Li, Xie, Teo & 
Peng, 2010; Malhotra & Lumineau, 2011; Poppo & Zenger, 2002; and Schepker et al., 2014).  Studies 
supporting a substitutory relationship argue that firms invest in the development of relational contracts 
only where transactional attributes render the cost of formal contracting prohibitive.  And conversely, 
where relational contracts are well developed, formal contracts are potentially damaging to relational 
contracts and redundant at best (Cao & Lumineau, 2015; Malhotra & Lumineau, 2011; Williamson, 
1993).  However, some studies suggest that investments in relational contracts are unrelated to 
transactional attributes (relational risks) (Schepker et al., 2014).  As complements, formal and relational 
contracts are argued to be mutually reinforcing.  Formal contracts signal an intention to co-operate that 
facilitates the development of relational contracts (Cao & Lumineau, 2015), and relational contracts can 
foster continuation of formal contracts in the face of change or conflict (Poppo & Zenger, 2002).  In a 
meta-analysis of existing literature, Cao and Lumineau (2015) find strong evidence of 
complementarities between formal and relational contracts but conclude that the interplay between 
formal and relational contracts is context specific. Factors that affect this relation include the exchange 
hazards or risks inherent in different types of inter-firm relationships (Cao & Lumineau, 2015), temporal 
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factors (Huber, Fischer, Dibbern & Hirschheim, 2013), as well as firms’ preferences for the use of either 
formal or relational contracts (Bolton, Malmrose & Ouchi, 1994; Li et al., 2010). The impact of these 
influences on the relative use of formal and relational contracts in co-opetitive contexts is unclear. 
In summary, we seek to understand better how alliance risks in co-opetitive settings influence the use 
of formal and relational contracts. We also aim to investigate the interplay between the two.  Few studies 
consider the nature of the contracts selected and how these address specific alliance risks.   
Research Question 2: What are the roles of formal contracts and relational contracts for the control 
of co-opetitive alliances? What is the relation between formal contracts and relational contracts in this 
setting? 
3 Research Design 
We conducted our study in the independent trade publishing sector in the United Kingdom, a setting in 
which firms conspicuously engage in co-opetitive activities.7  We employ field-based research methods 
in order to capture rich evidence of the relational risks and the associated governance mechanisms in 
this setting, thus responding to recent calls for qualitative evidence in the area of relational contracting 
(for example, Cao & Lumineau, 2015). Our study investigates a sales alliance between six independent 
publishing houses that together account for almost half of the trade publishing volumes in the 
independent sector (Tivnan & Lewis, 2015a). We conducted our study in this particular alliance because 
it is a complex setting involving both vertical and horizontal collaborations in which both formal and 
informal agreements between firms are evident. We collect data from each of the six publishing houses.  
This plurality of viewpoints enables us to obtain a comprehensive picture of the relational risks and 
governance of the alliance (Caglio & Ditillo, 2008; Dekker, 2015). Brief descriptions of each of these 
                                                     
7 Trade publishing focuses on the production of fiction and non-fiction titles for consumption by the general 
public.  The other main sectors within the publishing industry include: educational publishing; academic 
publishing; and reference publishing (e.g. dictionaries and encyclopaedias) (Germano, 2008). Typically, 
classification of a publisher reflects the genre that forms the majority of their output. 
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firms, which we refer to using the pseudonyms Austen, Brontë, Carroll, Dickens, Eliot, and Gaskell, 
are included in Appendix 1.8  
The sales alliance entails both ‘horizontal’ activities between competing partners, aimed at increasing 
book sales and securing promotional opportunities with key booksellers, as well ‘vertical’ buyer-
supplier arrangements. In addition to the sales alliance, we also collected data on various other inter-
firm activities including the group purchasing of printing services and the outsourcing of production 
services. Outsourcing of production services involves a ‘vertical’ relationship in which one firm 
provides third-party services to another, smaller, firm. Group purchasing of printing services is a 
‘horizontal’ activity in which the firms pool resources in order to obtain economies of scale in printing 
volumes. The sales alliance is the focus of this paper as the most strategically important and complex 
of the alliances in which the firms are involved, and thus provides the basis for addressing our research 
questions.  While we do not include a full analysis of the risks and associated governance mechanisms 
in the other alliances we do draw on data from these other alliances to demonstrate how attributes of 
relational contracting may be deployed across multiple alliances with common membership.9 We depict 
the alliances studied in Figure 1. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
We analyse data gathered from 26 semi-structured interviews with 21 participants, including the 
managing director of each publishing house and sales directors from three of the firms.10  A list of all 
participants interviewed in the study is included in Appendix 1. Interviews ranged in time from forty-
five minutes to one and a quarter hours, averaging one hour in duration. We asked participants to reflect 
                                                     
8 We also collect data from a seventh publishing house, Hardy, included in Appendix 1. Hardy is not a member 
of the sales alliance; it is a member of the third-party production alliance with Brontë.  
9 We include a summary of observed mechanisms of relational contracting for the third-party production and 
printing alliances in Appendix 2. 
10 We conducted our first interviews at Brontë, where we interviewed the managing director and each of his five 
functional specialists. During our interviews with these five individuals, it became apparent that their direct 
involvement in collaborations with competitor firms was minimal. In our visits to the remaining firms, we 
therefore conducted interviews with the managing directors of these firms and any staff they identified as having 
substantive involvement in collaborations with competitor firms. We use interview data collected from suppliers 
and customers to the alliance to validate the contextual industry and market data provided by the publishers. 
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on the rationale for co-opetitive activity, alliance risks, and the control mechanisms employed.  We 
used an interview guide to ensure that we covered all relevant themes in each interview and to help 
minimise the potential for interviewer-induced bias (Minichiello, Aroni, Timewell, & Alexander, 1995). 
The interviews were audio-recorded and then transcribed verbatim (McCracken, 1988). We also 
collected a range of archival documents. Documents include company and industry publications such 
as operating reports, industry and company outlooks and histories, press releases, and financial 
statements.  We referred to data from these various sources to construct the descriptions of the 
independent trade publishing sector and each publishing house that are presented in Appendix 1. We 
were unable to collect any archival documents that specifically relate to the 'collaborations'. There is no 
publically available information, and commercial sensitivities precluded the firms from permitting us 
to retain copies of formal contracts and other internal documents.    
Both authors coded the interview data using the software package NVIVO. As coding reflects the 
association of text with one or more broad themes of interest, inter-coder reliability between researchers 
was high. We uncovered a small number of minor exceptions, which we resolved through further 
discussion.  NVIVO search and retrieval tools permitted the text in the transcripts to be reorganised and 
reported back under the various themes of interest identified in the coding schema.  Using the 
reorganised transcripts, we then systematically analysed each key theme (Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
We created summaries of key themes for each interviewee that included quotations from the interview 
transcripts as well as memos created by the authors that reflected some data interpretation and analysis. 
These summaries form the basis of the findings presented in this paper.  
4 The Independent Publishing Sector in the United Kingdom and the Sales Alliance 
A large number of independent publishing houses together with small conglomerates account for 40 per 
cent of trade publishing turnover in the United Kingdom.  The top ten conglomerate publishing firms 
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account for the remainder (Tivnan & Lewis, 2015a; 2015b).11 The commercial success of all trade 
publishers is dependent on their ability to purchase or commission book titles that will sell in large 
volumes to bookshops and other booksellers, such as supermarkets and online sellers. Significant 
pressures on profit margins extend across the value chain. Publishers make advanced payments to 
authors, some years ahead of the publication date, but sell to booksellers on a consignment basis. The 
purchasing power of the major booksellers places further pressures on publishing firms with smaller 
book lists and fewer commercial book titles.  Further, there is significant uncertainty surrounding the 
performance of any given publication. Innocuous titles may become best-sellers while expected 
successes can fail. Pressures on all aspects of the publishing process create financial incentives for the 
independent publishers in our study to collaborate.  
The sales alliance, the main focus of our study, involves all the firms in our study.  Brontë, Carroll, 
Dickens, Eliot and Gaskell, small firms each with less than 30 employees, outsource part of their sales 
function to Austen.  Austen, the largest publishing house in this study, retains an in-house sales force 
that visits booksellers around the country with the aim of securing orders for new book titles.  Prior to 
using the sales function at Austen all purchasing firms contracted with specialist sales organisations 
(that are not publishing houses) for these services. A number of collaborative imperatives for the sales 
alliance are apparent.  First, the large numbers of publishers in the industry and the relative power of 
booksellers render access to potential customers increasingly difficult for any firm acting alone. 
Through collaboration in the sales alliance, this group of publishers creates a combined book list of the 
scale and quality required to improve access to booksellers. This level of access was not attained through 
their previous relationships with specialist sales organisations. Second, the purchasing firms lack the 
financial resources to establish and maintain their own in-house sales function, while Austen, the largest 
independent firm in our study, acquires a stable revenue stream to support its operations.   
                                                     
11 Conglomerate organisations operate a number of different businesses, of which publishing is just one element. 
They are regarded as constituting a separate sector within the publishing industry due to fundamental differences 
in their nature, structures, and strategic objectives.  
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The members of the sales alliance also undertake joint marketing activities in an effort to advance the 
promotional opportunities for book titles published by members to the alliance.  Thus, the alliance 
involves both vertical (outsourcing) as well as horizontal (group collaboration) activities. These 
activities require the firms to work closely and repeatedly together to derive the benefits available 
through collaboration. 
In the remainder of the paper, we present and discuss the empirical findings of an investigation into the 
management and control of co-opetitive activity between six independent publishing houses in the 
United Kingdom.  
5 Co-opetition and Control in the Sales Alliance 
We begin this section by describing the co-opetitive nature of the relationship between the firms. We 
then examine the alliance risks that arise between the independent publishing houses before analysing 
the role of formal and relational contracting for the control of these risks.   
5.1 The nature of co-opetition 
The firms in our study regard themselves as keen competitors in the area of sales, competing directly 
for orders from booksellers.  
“[T]here is no disguising [the competition between us] and everyone within the [alliance] knows that, it’s 
the basis on which we conduct all our business.” (Managing Director, Gaskell) 
Competition in sales for orders from booksellers manifests in each firm’s choice of the format, style, 
cover design, author, and title of each book, and the speed at which books are printed and distributed. 
“The supermarkets... they choose by cover really, more than anything else, so they would go for the most 
successful commercial-looking cover.” (Managing Director, Carroll) 
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The partners recognise that in joining the alliance and outsourcing sales to Austen, they also all compete 
for the attention of Austen’s salesforce to promote their books over their competitors.   
“Where we’re competitive is that our team here needs to make sure that they hound Austen as much as 
possible…[W]e’ve got to make sure that we give them all the ammunition they need in order to do that, so 
how I target everything at [Carroll] is that we’ve always got to be better than our competitors [in the 
alliance] with the information we provide, with the marketing materials we provide and with the publicity 
as well and then the quality of the books…I’m competing against Austen getting it out of the bag.” (Sales 
Director, Carroll) 
However, co-operation in the sales alliance brings many benefits to the firms.  Most importantly, by 
working together the firms secure access to booksellers.  
“[T]he root of collaboration is: collectively we are stronger… in dealing with reluctant partners, like large 
retailers.  When they see all our books for a season fanned out together, [they] find us the best list.” 
(Managing Director, Carroll) 
 
“[M]any of the people round the table can’t ever forget that they wouldn’t even have the conversation with 
the retailer if they were not [in the sales alliance].” (Managing Director, Eliot) 
 
“[I]t’s collaborative, it’s separate houses coming together to share skills and [improve] access [to 
booksellers] and you have to forego a certain control, which you would have if you were dealing with [major 
bookseller] direct.” (Managing Director, Gaskell) 
The firms also engage in co-operative activities to improve their access to the limited promotional 
opportunities offered by booksellers. Collectively, the firms generate far greater opportunities for the 
alliance than would be possible by each firm acting on its own. However, the firms must then compete 
for the opportunities they jointly create.  For example, the firms must reach agreement as to the book 
titles from the alliance’s collective list that will receive the ‘promotional slots’ awarded by supermarket 
chains to the alliance and reap the associated sales orders.  
“We are competing for a finite amount of shelf space and promotional slots.” (Managing Director, Dickens) 
 
“One or two of the supermarkets said to the [sales alliance] ‘you have two slots a month.’ So the lucky 
publishers will print and the [supermarkets] would order a minimum of 10,000 copies…So there we are 
competing immediately and directly against all the other companies in the [alliance]…But without the [sales 
alliance] you wouldn’t have any slots at all. So you have two to share…rather than none on your own.” 
(Managing Director, Carroll) 
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The firms base their collective decision solely on the book title that is likely to have the greatest mass-
market appeal and will therefore generate a high level of sales, thus enhancing the alliance’s reputation. 
The benefits that accrue to the firm in receipt of a promotional slot motivates all firms to co-operate in 
this activity, despite the knowledge that the slots are not shared equally. 
“It’s not democratic, you don’t say ‘well you had it last month’ ‘cause that’s not how it works with the 
supermarkets.” (Managing Director, Carroll) 
The firms also collaborate in other sales and marketing activities.  For example, when jointly publicising 
new book titles the firms informally agree which books will be included in any communication, the 
third-party agency employed to organise associated events, as well as the format, wording, and date of 
the press release. Similar processes are used to support partners in their individual business activities. 
For example, a firm may delay a planned book launch to ensure it does not interfere with that of another 
partner to the alliance. The firms also co-operate by sharing information, skills and expertise that shape 
both their individual and joint activities. Co-operation requires the firms to work closely and repeatedly 
together to exploit the benefits available to them. They face continual pressures to navigate the co-
operative and competitive tensions that stem from working together.  
“[E]ach of us are very proud of our own independence and so there are both centrifugal and centripetal 
forces in the alliance ‘cause we want to do our own thing as well as doing things together...[F]or example 
we’d all rather speak to the media and see our own companies represented in the media than simply the 
[sales alliance].” (Managing Director, Carroll) 
5.2 Alliance risks 
We identify a variety of risks in the sales alliance, stemming from both the vertical (outsourcing to 
Austen) and horizontal joint activities of the sales alliance. Relational risks are apparent in the 
outsourcing activities where each firm recognises the potential for Austen to misappropriate information 
gained during the course of inter-firm exchanges.  Austen obtains insights into its competitors’ 
strategies and, specifically, access to pre-publication information relating to each new book title.  As a 
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publisher itself, Austen could readily identify and incorporate valuable aspects of this commercially 
sensitive information into their own publication processes.  
“[I]f you’re developing a list of titles with a particular thread running through it, or you’re trying to hit a 
particular market with a particular type of book in terms of format, trying to develop something you thought 
was new, how do you protect a partner from taking that away from you?” (Managing Director, Eliot) 
The outsourcing firms also recognise the scope and motivation for Austen to behave opportunistically. 
For example, Austen’s partners express concerns as to whether their book titles receive equal 
prominence and attention by sales people during pitches to booksellers. 
“[I]f I was [Austen] I would want my sales people to get my books out of the bag first; it’s just human nature, 
and you accept that.” (Managing Director, Eliot) 
 
“The big downside; ...we were the first out of the bag for [previous sales organisation], we won’t be for 
Austen.  And so that’s a problem.” (Managing Director, Brontë) 
Similarly, Austen has both the capacity and incentive to delay informing its partners about forthcoming 
discussions with major booksellers, or could even withhold such information altogether. Austen could 
also undermine its competitors’ sales activities by, for example, speeding up or delaying certain aspects 
of the process. As the larger partner in the alliance, Austen could potentially also use its size to obtain 
unfair advantages, for example, in contractual negotiations with each partner. While we find no 
evidence of opportunistic behaviour by Austen, its partners highlight that there is a higher level of risk 
associated with outsourcing to Austen, a direct competitor, which did not arise in their previous 
relationships with specialist sales organisations. 
“It clearly does not give you a sales advantage to be dependent on [Austen’s] salesforce because, of course, 
if you have two not dissimilar titles, which one are they going to promote first? On us they take commission, 
on theirs they take a full publishing profit.” (Managing Director, Carroll) 
However, Austen’s incentive to exploit its size and unique role is reduced through its dependence on 
the other firms, recognised on both sides of the buyer-supplier relationship. This belief in the long-term 
benefits of collaboration to Austen mitigates the risk perceived by its partners. 
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“As a salesperson, you sell what you can sell. So I think the risk [for our partners] is tiny, and the benefits 
are enormous. [W]e earn good commission, and, you know, we push literature and poetry and drama, it’s 
hard to make money out of some of what we do.…[S]o in terms of scaling down our costs, and recovering 
them…to be able to afford that is really good news.” (Managing Director, Austen) 
 
“They need us, because we can amortise quite a lot of their sales overhead...there’s quite a lot of upside in 
it for them.” (Managing Director, Brontë) 
In relation to the ‘horizontal’ activities of the alliance, firms acknowledge that they are exposed to the 
risks of opportunistic behaviour from all partners, not just Austen. For example, any firm could attempt 
to establish covertly a relationship with a bookseller that might provide them with an advantage over 
their partners.  
“[A]n exclusive deal with a retailer on the part of one of the houses that in some way impeded, grossly 
impeded, the activities of the other houses at that time…a sort of exclusive arrangement that was for short 
term commercial gain but necessarily at the expense of everyone else, that would be the kind of thing that 
would be very, very destructive.” (Managing Director, Gaskell) 
Similarly, knowledge of a firm’s marketing strategies could enable a partner to sabotage a competitor’s 
book launch by releasing in advance a competing book title, while collaboration in joint marketing 
activities exposes firms to the risk that a partner may choose or need to delay the process.  
“To maximize the P[ublic] R[elations] potential, the press release does [need to go out on Monday]. If I 
was being entirely selfish I would say, no, it’s got to go out on Monday, and, for [Managing Director of 
Carroll], it’s too bad.” (Managing Director, Dickens) 
Thus, firms have various opportunities to behave in ways that would undermine a partner – and 
occasionally succumb to such temptations.   
“I did a rather naughty thing…some of my colleagues weren’t that thrilled. I probably should have asked 
them but if I’d asked them they’d have said no…” (Managing Director, Brontë) 
Furthermore, firms attempt to manage carefully discussions about forthcoming book titles and 
marketing strategies in order to ensure that they do not accidentally release information beyond that 
required to support the collaboration.  
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“The whole protection of intellectual property was as much a concern for us as anyone else. …There are 
lots of concerns about working with another publisher.” (Managing Director, Eliot) 
Our data revealed a unique type of relational risk that can arise in alliances between competing partners. 
While acknowledging the need for close co-operation, the firms are anxious to maintain their 
independence, an important element of which includes protecting their individual identities and 
competitive positioning.  
“The thing that mustn’t be shared, in any way, is...the actual process by which books get to be 
[commissioned by a publishing house], how they look, how they are shaped…The individual personality of 
the company mustn’t be shared; it would be a disaster.” (Managing Director, Austen) 
They express concern that inclusion in the same ‘sales bag’ as their competitors could engender 
increased homogeneity between their product offerings through unwitting imitation. The firms are 
aware that participation in the sales alliance heightens the potential for convergence between their 
identities and product offerings over time as they share details of each other’s products and marketing 
strategies.   
Finally, we find that partners to the alliance are also particularly vigilant to the risk of actual or perceived 
anti-competitive behaviour arising from co-operative activity with their competitors.  The firms 
acknowledge the need to ensure they do not breach legislative requirements relating to collusion, for 
example, in price fixing. 
“[W]e are in the business of looking at ways of collaborating...Obviously not being anti-competitive or 
anything like that…[W]e can’t talk about pricing or terms of trade, all that kind of stuff.” (Managing 
Director, Brontë) 
In the following sections, we explore the use of formal and relational contracting in managing the 
relational risks related to concerns about misappropriation, opportunistic behaviour, and homogeneity 
and those related to anti-competitive behaviour.  
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5.3 The role of formal contracting within the sales alliance 
In relation to the outsourcing activities of the alliance, each firm maintains an individual contract with 
Austen. This standard contract specifies the annual fee and commission rate payable to Austen. It also 
includes the obligations on each party in relation to the operational aspects of the sales process, mutually 
agreed targets, and the timely provision of manuscripts, inspection copies, and pre-publication 
information about each book title. 
Despite the explicit and highly measurable nature of the sales process, and the risks associated with 
passing this activity to a close competitor, the contract does not include any specific, formally monitored 
performance measures for Austen. The firms acknowledge the challenges involved in contracting for 
performance in the high uncertainty environment of book publishing.  
“[We might not reach our sales targets] ‘cause we published the book late, because the cover was bad, 
because the author didn’t do the publicity they were promising, because the reviews were terrible.  There is 
no way of knowing.  [Austen] may do a great job and the book still disappoints or they may do very little 
and then it slowly takes off.” (Managing Director, Carroll) 
The formal contracts are seldom used to manage any aspect of the relationship between Austen and 
each firm, with managing directors believing that to do so may in fact damage inter-firm co-operation. 
“I’ve never known anyone bring contractual points to bear on a business relationship...People will often 
halfway down the line scratch their head and go, ‘What did we say in the contract?’ We almost use it as a 
mutual reference point, as to how they should resolve the situation... publishing has a reputation of being 
gentlemanly, and it tends to be.” (Managing Director, Dickens) 
Instead, the contracts are used primarily for the purpose of managing performance risk: to plan and co-
ordinate the requirements of each firm in relation to the activities of the salesforce. The contracts are 
standard for the industry and details are mutually determined by both sides to the agreement.  
“[The contract] just says that there are obligations on both sides to keep each other up to date on what’s 
going on. It isn’t more detailed than that.” (Sales Director, Carroll) 
 
“[I]t’s like a relay race, you know, if your hand goes out and if nothing goes in it, you start getting cross, 
and saying… where is it? [Dates and other requirements are] extremely formally specified, absolutely clear, 
completely clear, rigorously clear.” (Managing Director, Austen) 
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While Austen, as the provider, is responsible for managing and co-ordinating the sales process, we 
found no evidence that they were dictating the terms of each contract, and, in fact, their reliance on the 
revenue stream from the alliance reduces their incentive to do so. 
The contracts between Austen and each of its partners also include standard confidentiality clauses. 
While the firms acknowledge that Austen could misappropriate information from buyer-supplier 
activities for its own internal purposes, these clauses are designed to mitigate the risk that Austen might 
pass planned and actual sales information onto to another partner in the alliance (regulatory risks of 
buyer-supplier activities).  
Notably, sales to the centralised purchasing offices at the major booksellers, accounting for 40 to 50 
percent of each firm’s turnover, remain within the control of the individual firms. By removing Austen’s 
access to these key accounts, the firms eliminate the risk that Austen’s salesforce will offer its own 
books to this important customer group before those of its partners. However, this does not entirely 
mitigate the risk that Austen could behave opportunistically. For example, Austen’s detailed knowledge 
of its partners’ activities means that it can speed up its production of a similar book or copy elements 
of a partner’s marketing strategy. 
Either Austen or the purchasing firm, subject to a set notice period, can end the contract. Each contract 
between Austen and a purchasing firm is separate and is not dependent on the existence or terms of any 
other contract in the alliance. Similarly, there is no formal contract between all partners to govern the 
broader horizontal activities of the alliance. The alliance partners deliberately eschew the use of a formal 
binding agreement or other formal outcome mechanisms as they regard the precise nature of the various 
horizontal activities and the requisite behaviours as difficult to specify ex ante and hence expensive to 
contract.  
“No contracts, [just a] gentlemen’s agreement…because every time we get into a strata of detail we incur 
very large costs and we create huge problems…We have a whole raft of letters of agreement, they are 
generated in-house but are pretty clear and good and thorough and they’re perfectly sufficient. [Y]ou need 
some agreement about feedback and monitoring on a quarterly basis,…has anyone misbehaved?” 
(Managing Director, Brontë) 
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As well as deciding against the use of a contract to manage the sales alliance, the firms in our study 
have also considered and rejected the idea of formal structures such as governance authorities.  
“[T]here has often been a question should there be any kind of executive, a constitution that governs us and 
all of that, and there’s no appetite for it...[A]nd why, I think ‘cause the thing works.” (Managing Director, 
Austen) 
Despite the absence of formal contracts or governance mechanisms to manage the broader horizontal 
activities of the alliance, we find that the individual contracts between Austen and each of its partners, 
designed for buyer-supplier activities, exert an indirect influence on the horizontal relationships 
between the firms. The standard confidentiality clauses in these contracts ensure that a partner’s 
proprietary information remains between Austen and the firm.  Thus, adherence to the confidentiality 
clauses in individual contracts implicitly restricts the proprietary information that can be known widely 
between the alliance partners and used in relation to other sales and marketing activities.  
“Each of us observes each other’s commercial confidentiality. So I genuinely do not know what the other 
contracts are.” (Managing Director, Carroll) 
By strictly adhering to confidentiality clauses in their contracts with Austen, the firms also reduce the 
risk of accusations of anti-competitive behaviour in relation to their horizontal activities, for example, 
in relation to price-fixing. Austen, as the supplier to each of the other firms, is particularly alert to 
activities that could be construed as either opportunistic or anti-competitive. 
“[O]ne must always be mindful that you can’t put those people in the room to discuss commercial matters 
of the individual businesses.” (Managing Director, Austen) 
5.4 The role of relational contracting within the sales alliance 
The firms rely heavily on relational contracting to mitigate the risks associated with the joint activities 
that constitute the sales alliance.  Both the vertical and the horizontal activities are governed primarily 
through the use of informal agreements (relational contracts).  In this section, we discuss the specific 
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contracting mechanisms evident within the sales alliance.  We pay attention to the ways in which these 
mechanisms work to mitigate particular relational risks.   
Common membership of an industry guild and prior employment at conglomerate publishing houses 
have created social ties between the firms that provide the basis for selecting partners with similar 
objectives and values.  
“[W]hen [managing director Austen] arrived at Austen and became the managing director and asked me 
to go there with the Carroll sales, I immediately said yes. I did that. So we do have a long standing 
relationship…” (Managing Director, Carroll) 
In forming the alliance, the firms have collectively developed an explicitly stated set of values to which 
all partners are expected to subscribe.12 The firms acknowledge the strength of the social ties between 
them, and articulate the importance of supporting the unique character of each firm as a central shared 
value.  
“I think there are very strong ties.” (Managing Director, Eliot) 
“We want each of these companies to be so distinct and innovative. The sympathy is all about the notion 
that you have the freedom to be yourself.” (Managing Director, Austen) 
Implicit values, such as expressions of solidarity towards partner firms, are also evident in the alliance.  
“[The group] is very, very important for solidarity…it is quite an isolated task and you wonder what other 
people are doing and want to know that other people are doing the same thing as you.” (Managing Director, 
Carroll) 
The values that characterise the alliance mitigate relational risks between firms in several ways.  First, 
by demonstrating commitment to the values a firm can signal to its partners its intention to engage in 
co-operative behaviours and, by implication, to abstain from opportunistic actions.  Second, the values 
                                                     
12 We are unable to list these explicit values due to the risk that this will identify the alliance and its member firms. 
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help mitigate the risk of homogeneity between firm product offerings by providing an explicit reminder 
of the shared belief in the value of diversity in product offerings. 
In addition to the values articulated by the partners, the alliance seeks to promote norms of behaviour 
(codes of conduct) between firms.  These behavioural norms set out a framework of expectations 
between firms in the alliance that would not normally be extended to other competitors in the publishing 
industry. For example, the firms have an implicit understanding that they will not ‘poach’ human capital 
from each other. 
“[T]here are basic rules...they’re not formal and they’ve never been specifically articulated but there is a 
presumption against poaching each other’s staff and authors, which we’re generally very willing to do in 
publishing.” (Managing Director, Carroll) 
Compliance with these behavioural norms requires self-restraint by each firm.  As with the shared 
values, the exercise of restraint serves to demonstrate each firm’s commitment to the alliance, and plays 
an important role in sustaining the informal agreements between firms. Self-regulating behaviours by 
the firms are apparent in both the horizontal and the vertical activities. 
[T]here is no written constitution or appeals process and arbitration. No, it’s much more about building up 
trust and relationships...and not behaving badly.” (Managing Director, Carroll) 
 
“I think that we’ve always had a very high level of trust with Austen as an organisation keeping those 
Chinese walls in place…’cause they have access to a lot of our sales information.” (Managing Director, 
Eliot) 
However, reliance on the self-restraint of partners exposes each firm to the risk of opportunistic 
behaviour. We find that informal gatherings and attendance at meetings provide firms with 
opportunities to monitor that their partners continue to act in expected ways.   
“[Positive behaviours] reinforce trust in terms of ongoing collaborations…Each of us individually would 
subscribe to those values…but perhaps in the sense of there being other people watching you, you’re doubly 
minded to uphold those values.” (Managing Director, Gaskell) 
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Meetings and informal gatherings between any combination of the firms facilitate the flow of 
information. In particular, reputational information about each other and other firms in the industry 
helps to safeguard exchanges between the partners.   
“We share information, we share gossip, and that gossip’s incredibly important.” (Managing Director, 
Brontë) 
For example, the Managing Director at Brontë indicated the importance of reputational information in 
informing his decision to select Austen as his outsourcing partner. 
“Carroll, who are very good friends of ours, who are only a mile up the road - I meet their Managing 
Director for coffee every now and again – they were delighted with [the service from Austen].”  (Managing 
Director, Brontë) 
Meetings between firms are also important in creating a sense of solidarity among partner firms in ways 
that promote collaborative rather than opportunistic behaviours. 
“[Our meetings] reinforce the sense of togetherness, common goals, common threats, and the desire to work 
together to mitigate those threats.” (Managing Director, Gaskell) 
Regular meetings also enable the outsourcing firms to monitor Austen’s behaviours and commitment 
to the vertical, buyer-supplier, activities within the alliance. Any concerns about Austen’s behaviour or 
performance are evaluated within the uncertainty of the sales process and the overall benefits of the 
arrangement.  
“[I]t really is a fine balance between beating the [salesforce] up, getting really cross, and then going back 
to them a week later and saying, ‘So, here’s our new books, would you like to submit these as well?’ with a 
smile on your face…We’ve just had [author] published…The supermarkets have turned it down. We are 
disappointed, but we have to believe that Austen did the best job for that [title]. I’ve got no other way to get 
to a supermarket without them.” (Sales Director, Carroll) 
While meetings and gatherings between firms are themselves an important relational contracting 
mechanism they also further expose firms to alliance risks, particularly given their in-depth 
understanding of each other’s business.  Thus, this mechanism is a ‘double-edged sword’ in both 
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creating alliance risks while simultaneously mitigating them via the monitoring opportunities meetings 
provide. 
Despite the various relational contracting mechanisms in place, opportunistic behaviours have occurred 
in the past. One managing director admitted to a minor misdemeanour and acknowledged that he would 
not repeat such behaviour, knowing it to be against the accepted norms. 
“I won’t do it again…[I]t wasn’t very collegial.” (Managing Director) 
Adherence to the shared values and the ‘rules’ of conduct they imply is an expectation of continued 
involvement in collaborative activity. Any firm that unilaterally pursues its own agenda to the detriment 
of the sales alliance faces an implicit threat of sanctions from all partners that may jeopardise its 
participation in current or future collaborative activities. 
“[Firm] transgressed… But it’s a generous group and we said ‘you’ve had your wrist slapped, we’ll put up 
with it, but don’t do it again’.” (Managing Director, Austen) 
We find much evidence of the firms’ willingness to restrain from opportunistic behaviour in order to 
protect their membership of the alliance. For example, despite being the largest firm in the alliance, 
Austen has a strong motivation to behave in accordance with the norms of the group because it is 
mutually dependent on its partners for both access to booksellers and the financial benefits available 
from collaboration.  
“We have to be trusted to look after everyone’s interests, at the very least at the same amount as Austen… 
[W]hen we sell [best selling book title] by [author] from [another publishing house], it’s coming out of the 
bag first, because if I’m a sales person and I’ve got call to make, I want them to feel good about me before 
I’ve even begun…[the Managing Director of Dickens and Managing Director of Brontë] say to me explicitly 
‘this damn thing wouldn’t work if you weren’t so generous.’ And they mean it…I see it as smart capitalism.” 
(Managing Director, Austen) 
Similarly, the Managing Director of Carroll explained how he might agree to delay a planned book 
launch to ensure it did not interfere with that of a partner to the alliance.  
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“Austen [might] say ‘Well, [sales alliance competitor]’s got this book coming out in November, they can’t 
move [the launch] because they’re bringing out the author from Australia…don’t you think you should move 
yours to October or December?” (Managing Director, Carroll) 
Examples of self-regulating behaviour are also evident in mitigating the risks associated with 
homogeneity in product offerings and anti-competitive behaviours. 
“I]t’s very beneficial to see, oh, well [another member firm] is doing a huge marketing campaign for 
that…[W]e always try to be different to them as well.” (Sales Director, Carroll) 
 
“[Our meetings help us] to share information, to share knowledge, to share experiences. Always without 
numbers attached so as not to breach any commercial, legal borders.” (Managing Director, Gaskell) 
The firms are aware that acting unilaterally for short-term gains places at risk their continued 
involvement in collaborative activities. By demonstrating self-restraint, a firm provides assurance to its 
partners of its commitment to the alliance, thus reducing the need for constant monitoring or formal 
agreements. 
“If I did a thing like that [send a press release before securing agreement from our partners], we would 
never be in this position anyway, because no-one would want to deal with someone like that…That is just 
not the spirit in which this [alliance] works.” (Managing Director, Dickens) 
The informal agreements between the firms enable partners to make individual decisions about which 
activities of the sales alliance to join, based on the perceived value to their business. 
“[T]here are bilateral and trilateral set-ups within the [alliance] as well. In fact,...there’s almost nothing 
we all do at the same time. Everyone has opt-ins and opt-outs… Nobody has ever done anything that harms 
their business for the greater good of the sales alliance, not once, and we wouldn’t either.” (Managing 
Director, Brontë) 
These arrangements provide the firms with assurance that a partner whose objectives are no longer 
aligned with the other firms can leave the alliance rather than being forced to remain, potentially 
exposing the group to opportunistic behaviours. Flexibility in arrangements between firms is important 
for sustaining the informal agreements between the firms. 
“Nothing stops [people walking away.” (Managing Director, Eliot) 
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“I want to be sure that everyone is in for the long-term…to be clear about whether there is a risk to us of 
someone pulling out. But there has to be some flexibility…I mean, you need to allow for people to change 
their mind on very reasonable grounds. “They [might leave if ]…being a member of the alliance was not 
aligned with their business aims.” (Managing Director, Austen) 
The firms thus recognize that the continuation of the alliance depends on demonstrable benefits to each 
firm beyond those attainable by working alone or with other firms. Self-interest is the key motivation 
for continued participation.  
“[T]hey see the strength in success for the alliance is success for them so [it’s] enlightened self-interest.” 
(Managing Director, Austen) 
 
“[W]e can only collaborate if it’s in everyone’s self-interest. We have tried to do things ‘cause they will be 
nice to do... but it doesn’t work…There’s just not enough upside…We can only act together when the stakes 
are very, very high.” (Managing Director, Brontë) 
In summary, we observe a range of relational contracting mechanisms in the sales alliance that mitigate 
the relational risks within the alliance and permit reliance on informal agreements (relational contracts). 
Observed mechanisms include shared values, an implicit understanding as to appropriate behavioural 
norms, alliance meetings and informal gatherings, and the threat of sanctions.  Notably, we observe 
these same mechanisms in other alliances these managing directors have established, such as the 
printing alliance and third-party production alliance.13  Our findings suggest that these mechanisms 
work by reinforcing the notion that commitment to the alliance is likely to be more beneficial in the 
long-term to each partner than are opportunistic behaviours. Firms’ acceptance of the long-term benefits 
of the alliance encourages them to engage in light-touch but perceptible monitoring of each other, and 
informs their selection of partners who are willing to subscribe to the same values. The evidence 
suggests that social ties, self-regulating behaviour, flexibility, and enlightened self-interest support 
these mechanisms in ways that enable the firms to make and keep informal agreements (relational 
contracts).   
                                                     
13 While space constraints prevent us from explaining in detail each of these other alliances, Appendix 2 provides 
summary evidence of risks and relational contracting in the other alliances in which these firms participate. Our 
analyses of the third-party production and printing alliances revealed no different types of risks and no notable 
differences to the use of formal and relational contracts to those identified in the sales alliance.  We draw on our 
findings of the other alliances to demonstrate that the nature and use of relational contracting is not unique to the 
sales alliance.  
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6 Discussion of Findings 
In this section, we draw on our empirical findings to examine the role of formal and relational contracts 
in managing alliance risks in co-opetitive settings.  We also consider the interplay between formal and 
relational contracts.   
6.1 Alliance risks in co-opetitive alliances 
The firms in the alliance acknowledge the potential for misappropriation and opportunism as key 
concerns because, as close competitors, each firm can identify and readily exploit information gleaned 
from shared activities.  In relation to the outsourcing relationship with Austen, the purchasing firms 
acknowledge various ways in which Austen can misappropriate resources (for example, using 
purchasing firms’ pre-publication information to improve their own product offerings) as well as the 
scope for Austen to act opportunistically (for example, by ‘getting their book out of the bag first’).  
Further, firms acknowledge that the horizontal activities of the sales alliance expose them to potential 
opportunistic behaviour from all competing partners in the alliance, not just Austen (for example, all 
firms to the alliance can misappropriate product information that can readily be used to improve their 
own competitive position). Firms acknowledge that departures from co-operative behaviours, by Austen 
and other partners, have the potential to significantly impact their competitive advantage.  The partners’ 
concerns thus appear consistent with prior claims in the literature that relational risks will be more acute 
in co-opetitive contexts (for example, Caglio & Ditillo, 2008; Fernandez et al., 2014). In fact we find 
little evidence of, or appetite for, opportunistic behaviours. Rather, our findings support arguments that 
dependence and repeated exchanges between partners can reduce opportunistic behaviours because any 
firm that behaves against the norms of the group potentially faces the threat of exclusion from other 
collaborative activities crucial to their survival as an independent publisher (for example, reduced 
access to booksellers) (cf. Jap & Anderson, 2003; Williamson, 1993).  Furthermore, in the context of a 
co-opetitive alliance, while firms have a greater capacity to act opportunistically, they also have a keener 
ability to identify opportunistic behaviour by their partners. They also have a strong motivation to 
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identify such behaviours. In line with prior suggestions (for example Chaserant, 2003), we find that the 
expectation that opportunistic behaviour will be readily identified by partners further reduces the 
likelihood that any firm will engage in such behaviours. Our findings thus extend prior literature to 
demonstrate that, while relational risks between competitors may appear to be more acute, the nature of 
the co-opetitive context simultaneously acts to mitigate these concerns. Furthermore, consistent with 
Neumann (2010), we find that firms with a natural advantage, such as larger size, may restrain from 
using their power because of the perceived benefits that arise from the alliance. Austen’s size potentially 
increases its ability to act opportunistically in the role of supplier to the other firms but such behaviours 
could affect its long-term ability to extract gains from the alliance that it needs to support its activities.  
Our co-opetitive setting also enables us to identify an additional type of relational risk unique to 
competing partners. The firms in our study report a concern that sharing information with their 
competitors may, in subtle ways over time introduce homogeneity into their product offerings and 
reduce the distinctiveness of each firm.  This risk is not identified in prior studies, nor found in the 
inventory of inter-firm risks compiled by Anderson et al., (2014).  The publishing houses see the 
individual character and publishing attributes of their firm as a key source of competitive advantage 
that they must protect.  Thus, we demonstrate that relational risk comprises not only intentional acts to 
appropriate an inequitable distribution of rents from an alliance, but can extend to unwitting behaviours 
that reduce available rents to all partners. 
We also find that regulatory risk is a particularly salient concern in the co-opetitive context (cf. 
Anderson et al., 2014).  Any exchange of information that results in collaborating firms gaining 
financial advantage over their customers or suppliers exposes them to the risk of perceived or actual 
collusion, potentially bringing them foul of anti-competition legislation.  Thus, the competitor firms in 
the alliance we study are careful to ensure mechanisms are in place (such as confidentiality clauses) to 
alleviate both perceptions of, and the potential for, anti-competitive behaviour.  
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6.2 The role of formal contracts for the control of co-opetitive alliances 
Formal contracts are evident in relation to the vertical activities of the alliance where there are separate 
outsourcing contracts between Austen and each of the purchasers.  We find that these formal contracts 
play several roles.  First, they are considered by firms to mitigate regulatory risk in both the vertical and 
horizontal activities of the alliance where standard clauses, such as those relating to confidentiality, help 
to reduce both perceptions and breaches of anti-competitive behaviour. While this contrasts with the 
finding of Anderson et al. (2014) that compliance and regulatory risks are more likely to be associated 
with informal controls, we do find that relational contracts in place within the alliance also offer 
important safeguards to this type of risk.  Second, they define the nature of the relationship between 
Austen and the purchasing firm. As such, they are central to managing performance risks within the 
alliance by specifying many of the requirements for the co-ordination of exchange between firms in the 
outsourcing activities (Malhotra & Lumineau, 2011; Williamson, 2012).  However, there is a clear 
disinclination within the alliance to enforce contractual obligations in the event of poor performance.  
Consistent with extant literature, we find that the firms struggle to write complete contracts (Anderson 
& Dekker, 2014), due largely to the difficulties and costs associated with writing contracts for all 
foreseeable eventualities.  While the vertical activity in the sales alliance is highly measureable 
(number/length of sales calls, volume of sales, etc.) there is a great deal of uncertainty exerting influence 
on the final sales success of each book. We find that this reluctance to enforce contractual obligations 
arises not only from the difficulties of contracting for performance, but also, more importantly, from 
the broader view of the benefits of collaborations taken by each partner. Finally, despite evidence of 
poor behaviours or performance, we find little inclination to employ sanctions consistent with the notion 
that parties are not always able to distinguish misfeasance from a genuine misunderstanding and that 
penalties may exert a high cost on the punisher (Jones et al., 1997). 
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6.3 The role of relational contracting in co-opetitive alliances 
Our evidence indicates that relational contracting plays an important role in mitigating the risks 
associated with both the vertical and horizontal activities of the sales alliance. Based on our empirical 
findings, we structure our analysis below around mechanisms of relational contracting, factors that 
sustain relational contracting in this setting, and the outcomes of relational contracting. Our findings 
are summarised in Table 1. Finally, we conclude this section by discussing our findings in terms of 
economics-based arguments about the nature of exchanges between firms in co-opetitive alliances.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
6.3.1 Mechanisms of relational contracting 
Our findings indicate that a range of mechanisms address the risks of working with competing partners 
and support relational contracts between the firms in our study. Commitment to a shared set of values, 
institutionalised through social ties, is a means to signal to competing partners a willingness to engage 
in co-operative actions and to restrain from opportunistic behaviours. In addition to the values of the 
group, we also find evidence of implicit understandings between the firms, such as unwritten codes of 
conduct (for example, around poaching staff from other firms within the alliance), that indicate the 
scope and potential consequences of unacceptable behaviours. The implicit threat of collective 
sanctions, such as exclusion from joint activities, further helps to promote desirable behaviours. 
Meetings and other informal contacts between the managing directors provide the means through which 
they demonstrate their commitment to the collective values of the alliance and help to create a sense of 
solidarity that further encourages desirable behaviours. Gatherings involving member firms also enable 
them to share information about alliance activities and relationships, including reputational information 
about other partners, that can help to deter opportunistic behaviour as well as help to allay 
misunderstandings (cf. Gibbons & Henderson, 2012). Importantly, meetings also provide the means to 
monitor each other’s behaviour and provide assurances that partners will adhere to established norms 
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and shared values and act in ways that will not run foul of anti-competition legislation.  The firms are 
able to control the amount and scope of information they share through the involvement of only their 
most senior personnel (usually the managing and sales directors) in alliance activities. Careful 
management of contacts between firms is also essential in preserving the unique identity of each firm 
from the risk of homogeneity that may occur during the exchange of information and ideas. 
Crucially, the sales alliance consists of only six firms from the many that constitute the independent 
publishing sector. Prior studies (for example, Jap et al, 2003; Jones et al, 1997; Williamson, 1993) 
indicate that restricting the number of firms in an alliance is likely to enhance the effectiveness and 
efficiency of relational contracting. Our evidence indicates support for this argument in several ways. 
First, by restricting itself to a small number of firms the alliance is exposed to fewer potential 
occurrences of misappropriation or opportunism than if it were to contain a greater number of partners 
Second, a smaller number of firms offers greater potential for repeated interactions. Our respondents 
provided many examples of meetings and informal gatherings involving different combinations of 
alliance partners. Increased contact between member firms enhances both the accuracy of information 
about partners and the overall quality of monitoring undertaken. This is particularly salient in the 
context of our study, where competing partners possess a high level of knowledge of each other’s 
businesses and can therefore readily identify undesirable behaviours. The risks of homogeneity in 
product offerings and anti-competitive behaviour increase the importance of high-quality and frequent 
monitoring among these firms.  Third, by restricting membership to those firms that demonstrate 
commitment to a set of shared values the alliance is able to reduce the overall level and scope of 
monitoring required. For example, our respondents referred to monitoring only in informal terms, 
indicating that, for example, attendance at meetings was neither formally acknowledged nor recorded.  
We find that many of the mechanisms of relational contracting that operate within the sales alliance are 
not unique to this particular alliance but are also evident in the other alliances in which the various 
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partners collaborate together.14  For example, the shared values and behavioural norms at play in the 
sales alliance, similarly influence the printing alliance and the production alliance.  While meetings may 
be specific to the sales alliance they permit monitoring of behaviours across all alliances, as do informal 
gatherings between the managing directors.  This suggests that relational contracts need not be re-
developed or re-negotiated as new alliances are forged between partners, and indicates that, for this 
particular group of firms, they provide an effective and efficient form of contracting across multiple 
alliances. 
6.3.2 Factors that sustain relational contracts 
Our findings indicate several factors that enable relational contracts to develop and be sustained. Prior 
shared experiences facilitate efficient selection of partners based on shared values, and enable accurate 
monitoring of partners. Repeated exchanges and social ties promote an understanding of each other’s 
activities and desired outcomes, and hence reduce the monitoring required of each partner. Furthermore, 
the flexibility to join or abstain from any activity assures firms that partners are willing participants, 
potentially reducing the likelihood of undesirable behaviours. Underpinning the selection of controls to 
manage the relationships within the alliance is an awareness by the firms that the long-term gains from 
co-operation depend on conscious efforts to regulate their own behaviour. Self-regulating behaviours 
ensure a firm’s continued participation in joint activities and reduce the monitoring required of its 
partners. The importance of self-regulating behaviour is apparent, for example, in Austen’s assertion 
that it does not privilege its own book titles over those of its partners despite the short-term financial 
benefits this would afford. Austen’s partners are sceptical of this claim, but have no evidence to the 
contrary and are cognisant of the longer-term benefits to Austen that accrue from the alliance. The firms 
are similarly reliant on self-regulating behaviours in other joint activities of the alliance.  We find that 
self-regulating behaviour involves an implicit consideration of the likely benefits to co-operation and 
potential costs to opportunism for each firm – the ‘shadow of the future’ – and takes place in a context 
                                                     
14 Similar, dense networks of inter-related firms are reported in other industries (see Baker, Gibbons & Murphy, 
2008).   
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in which partners are able to monitor each other’s behaviour. Self-regulating behaviour reflects the 
concept of ‘enlightened self-interest’ (Chaserant, 2003; Williamson, 1993), and supports an economic 
rationale for all activities in which the firms participate.  
Finally, our data support theoretical notions that the various mechanisms and sustaining factors 
associated with relational contracting interact and reinforce each other (e.g. Jones et al, 1997). For 
example, regular interactions between the firms in our study provide continual opportunities to share 
information about each other’s behaviours whilst simultaneously reinforcing the shared values and 
sense of solidarity that, in turn, act to encourage self-regulating behaviours. 
6.3.3 Outcomes of relational contracting 
By mitigating the various relational risks between the firms in the alliance, relational contracting is able 
to support a number of informal agreements. These agreements cover both direct exchanges in 
horizontal activities between partners, for example compromises in relation to book launches, as well 
as joint exchanges between partners of the alliance in relation to suppliers and customers external to the 
collaborations. The agreements between the firms are contemporaneous and cover various activities 
within the alliance. Some agreements are made on a regular basis, while others, such as those relating 
to joint marketing communications, are discrete, can involve any number of partners, and are not 
dependent on the activities of the other firms.  
Consistent with the management and economics literatures (cf. Jap & Anderson, 2003; Williamson, 
1993), our findings indicate that repeated exchanges between the firms across the various activities 
reduce the risks of short-term opportunism and support the development of realistic, or credible, 
commitments. For example, agreements about joint marketing communications depend on the ability 
and self-interest of partners to fulfil their obligations. We find no evidence that firms make promises 
they are unlikely to keep. Again consistent with extant theory, our data suggest that the firms avoid 
committing themselves to activities or actions that they do not believe they can undertake (Williamson, 
1993). For example, the firms acknowledge that collaborative activities are likely to fail unless the 
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potential benefits to all participating firms are very high, thus indicating the calculus of gains and losses 
that underpins their commitments to each other.  
6.3.4 The myth of trust  
The behaviours of the firms in our study can be explained by reference to the ‘shadow of the future’ 
(Gibbons & Henderson, 2012). The firms in our study rely on particular relational mechanisms as low-
cost alternatives to formal contracts because ‘they work’. We suggest that the firms expressly avoid 
formal contracts, not because they ‘trust’ each other, but because relational contracts offer an effective 
and efficient way to manage the alliance. In particular, in the co-opetitive setting we explore, the firms 
possess both the ability and incentive to monitor closely each other’s behaviour. Furthermore, their in-
depth knowledge of each other’s business enables them to understand, rather than simply believe or 
trust, the basis on which commitments are made. As such, the relational contracts between the firms in 
our study provide cost-effective safeguards against opportunistic behaviours.  
While our respondents describe their relationships in terms of ‘trust’ and ‘trustworthy behaviour’, they 
simultaneously refer to ‘self-interested behaviour’, ‘enlightened self-interest’, and ‘smart capitalism’. 
These admissions of calculativeness exist alongside examples of self-regulating behaviours and a range 
of observable safeguards such as monitoring of partners. Our data thus demonstrate that the firms are 
cognisant of the inherent risks in co-operating with close competitors, the behavioural norms that 
underpin the relationships, the potential actions that could end a firm’s involvement in the alliance, the 
various safeguards in place to manage exchanges between the firms, and the importance of enlightened 
self-interest as a motivation for continuing to participate in the activities. Our findings thus support 
economics-based arguments that the concept of ‘trust’ can obscure the variety, nature, and extent of 
safeguards that manage inter-firm relations (Williamson, 1993). In fact, firms that rely on trust to 
manage their relationships with other firms may face increased costs if they neglect to ‘recognise, 
mitigate, and price out contractual hazards in a discriminating way’ (Williamson, 1993: 485). As such, 
we suggest that the concept of ‘trust’ adds neither to explanations nor predictions about the management 
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of risks within the alliance, indicating that it is more appropriately described as an ex post labelling of 
personal affect by those involved in economic exchange (Barney & Hansen, 1994). 
6.4 The relation between formal contracts and relational contracts in a co-opetitive setting  
Finally, we examine the relation between the use of formal contracts and relational contracts to manage 
alliance risks of co-opetition.  The literature is equivocal as to whether formal and relational contracts 
are substitutes or complements (see, for example, Cao & Lumineau, 2015; Schepker et al., 2014).  In 
our setting, we find clear evidence that relational contracts can substitute for formal contracts to mitigate 
risks within co-opetitive alliances.  Respondents in our study viewed the use of formal contracts as 
antithetical to the maintenance of effective working relationships with their alliance partners (the 
management of relational risks). This finding is consistent with several other studies that have assumed 
that the main function of formal contracts is control (Cao & Lumineau, 2015).  However, in our study 
respondents also identify the possible co-ordination role of formal contracts.  Despite evidence that 
formal contracts are used for co-ordination purposes in our setting respondents still report a hesitance 
to enforce formal contracts, even to mitigate performance risks (i.e. manage performance risks).  While 
formal contracts do reassure firms as to the management of regulatory risk, firms were also confident 
that breaches of anti-competition regulations would be deterred (or detected) through relational 
contracting mechanisms (i.e. regulatory risk is also managed via relational contracting). Thus, our 
findings contradict those of Woolthuis, Hillebrand and Nooteboom (2005) who contend that when 
formal contracts support co-ordination, as well as control, they may signal a commitment to the 
relationship that reinforces relational contracting (i.e. formal and relational contracts are complements).  
In our setting, formal contracting does not seem to add value above that of relational contracting, nor 
does it seem to facilitate shared values or understandings or other attributes of relational contracting.  
There are several plausible explanations for this finding.  First, the literature suggests that the temporal 
order in which formal and relational contracts are developed may influence the relationship between 
the two.  In our setting, attributes of relational contracting (for example, social ties and shared values) 
pre-dated the formal contracts.  Thus, the ‘security’ afforded by formal contracts is not required to 
45 
 
facilitate relational contracting (cf. Huber et al., 2013) and relational contracts alone are sufficient for 
control purposes.  An alternative plausible explanation is that in this sector firms have a preference for 
relational contracts.  Our participants referred frequently to the ‘gentlemanly’ nature of the publishing 
industry as an explanation as to why formal contracts were not used for the control of the sales alliance.  
Other studies have reported similar preferences for the use of either formal or relational contracts (cf. 
Bolton et al., 1994; Li et al., 2010).  Our findings provide further evidence that temporal sequencing 
and preferences may impact the nature of the relationship between formal and relational contracts. 
7 Conclusions 
Relational contracting, while used frequently in management and economics-based research to 
investigate and explain relationships between firms, has received scant attention in the management 
control literature. We identify the alliance risks that arise in the context of a co-opetitive alliance and 
examine, through the concepts of relational and formal contracting, the control mechanisms employed 
to mitigate those risks. While the control of inter-firm relationships is studied extensively, relatively 
fewer studies examine controls in contexts other than buyer-supplier activities. To date, the literature 
has not progressed far beyond propositions as to what specific risks we may expect in co-opetitive 
alliances other than suggesting that the relational risks are likely to be ‘more acute’.  We confirm 
misappropriation and opportunism as key alliance risks and also identify what we believe to be a 
previously unreported relational risk arising in alliances between non-competing partners; namely, the 
risk of homogeneity in firm ‘identities’ and product offerings.  We also highlight the importance of 
regulatory risk in this particular setting. Importantly, our context allows us to examine more closely the 
contention that risks are intensified in alliances between competitors.  As suggested in prior literature, 
we observe that the ability of competitors to readily identify and assimilate information and resources 
of value within the alliance is enhanced, given they operate in the same business sectors.  However, we 
find that co-operation with competitors also has an ‘off-setting’ effect not previously discussed in the 
literature.  That is, while the ability to misappropriate or act opportunistically may be more acute, the 
ability of other partners to the alliance to foresee such actions by their competitors mitigates the level 
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of risk in the alliance.  Finally, by collecting data from all members to the alliance, we increase the 
confidence that we have captured all salient relational risks in our co-opetitive setting (Caglio & Ditillo, 
2008). 
In examining controls in co-opetitive alliances we attempt to move beyond the contributions of extant 
studies, which largely provide evidence that where alliance risks are more complex or acute, partners 
to an alliance will respond by writing more complex formal contracts and will use these more intensely 
for control purposes.  Our findings suggest that relational contracts can substitute for formal contracts 
in co-opetitive contexts and are, in fact, the preferred means of mitigating alliance risks in our study.  
In investigating the role of relational contracts, we introduce to the management accounting and control 
literature a comprehensive organising framework, informed by our empirical data, within which 
relational contracts can be studied in greater depth in future studies.  This framework identifies 
mechanisms of relational contracts, including shared values, group norms and implicit understandings, 
as well as factors that sustain such contracts, including self-regulating behaviours and enlightened self-
interest.  Importantly, our data also suggest that the mechanisms of relational contracting can span 
multiple alliances.  Finally, we draw on the concepts of relational contracting to offer a more substantive 
explanation of co-operative behaviour between co-opetitive partners than is provided by the notion of 
‘trust’. In particular, we demonstrate how self-regulating behaviours, based on calculated risk-taking 
by partners and notions of ‘enlightened self-interest’, demonstrate a willingness to sacrifice short-term 
gains in order to protect longer-term interests. 
This study is subject to several limitations. Case-based research gives rise to the potential for researcher-
induced bias during both data collection and analysis. Careful attention to the design and execution of 
this study go some way to mitigating these issues, as does the use of dual researchers in the data coding 
and analysis phase (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Also, while the use of a case-study method and 
qualitative data facilitate the investigation of complex relations, it necessarily restricts the statistical 
generalisability of the research findings (Brownell, 1995; Yin, 2003). While we do not claim that inter-
firm alliances in this sector are representative of co-opetitive activity in other industries, they are a 
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useful starting point from which to investigate the under-researched phenomenon of relational 
contracting. Further, we acknowledge that our data come from a small sample that was purpose-
selected. Finally, while we investigate the use of formal and relational contracting to mitigate 
performance risk, our study does not seek to evaluate formally the success or otherwise of the particular 
collaborations in our study.  
The findings from our study suggest several fruitful avenues for further research. Future studies could 
explore the nature of relational contracting in different types of inter-firm relations, to provide further 
evidence of the relationship between specific alliance risks and the role of relational contracts.  There 
is also much scope to examine more closely the mechanisms of relational contracting and the means 
through which relational contracts are sustained.  While social controls are researched extensively 
within the management control literature, there remains scope to enhance understanding of the 
interrelation between specific elements of social controls, such as shared values and group norms.  Of 
the broader relational contracting mechanisms, which mechanisms are most important, and why? What 
factors determine a firm’s choice amongst viable contracting mechanisms?  How do relational contracts 
change over time, and what are the determinants of any such change? Similarly, the relation between 
formal and relational contracts remains relatively under-explored. What other factors may influence the 
choice between these governance mechanisms and the nature of the relation between them? Other 
economics-based theories, such as identity economics, might offer a useful means of exploring further 
the role of individuals in the selection and use of inter-firm control. There also remains much to 
understand in relation to how formal and relational contracts affect the performance outcomes of 
alliances. Furthermore, this is the first study of which we are aware in the management control literature 
that investigates the control of an alliance of firms engaged in co-opetitive activity.  Large scale archival 
and survey data that can provide more generalisable insights into the risks and control mechanisms in 
this form of alliance would be of interest. Further, firms are likely to vary in their ability to extract 
benefits from the alliance and so an understanding of firm-level controls that may assist firms to extract 
value from an alliance could provide interesting insights.  Finally, recent relational contracting papers 
in the management literature (e.g. Gibbons & Henderson, 2012; Schepker et al, 2014) adopt an 
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economics perspective when examining ‘trust’. This may be an indication that economics-based 
arguments are beginning to prevail in management research. Researchers in the area of management 
control may similarly wish to consider the usefulness of trust as an analytical device for understanding 
inter-firm governance.  
In summary, this study examines the role of formal and relational contracts for the control of co-
opetitive alliances, providing a timely contribution to ongoing debates relating to the nature and use of 
relational contracts, and more broadly the management of various forms of inter-firm relationships. 
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Appendix 1 – Research Setting 
Publishing 
House 
Description of Publishing House  Interviewees and Duration of Interview 
Austen The largest and oldest of the five houses, Austen has a substantial and high-quality backlist comprising 
both fiction and non-fiction books. Austen has sought to reduce its dependence on the vagaries of book 
publishing by contracting out the use of its sales function to other independent houses. 
Managing Director / Publishing Editor – 1 hour 
(first visit), 1 hour (second visit) 
Sales Director – 1 hour 
Brontë Brontë has a very small but rapidly expanding backlist of literary fiction and non-fiction. The firm also 
has a third-party agreement to publish books commissioned by another small publisher included in this 
study. This earns Brontë commission on each book sold and provides some revenue stability and 
insulation in a changeable industry.  
Managing Director / Publishing Editor – 1 hour 
(first visit), 1¼ hours (second visit), 1 hour (third 
visit) 
Sales Director – 1 hour 
Publicity Director / Associate Publisher – 1 hour 
Production Manager – ¾ hour 
Rights Director – ¾ hour 
Finance Director – 1 hour 
Carroll Carroll publishes a variety of fiction and non-fiction book titles. An important strand of Carroll’s 
publishing strategy is an extensive third-party arrangement to produce non-fiction books for a firm 
external to this alliance. 
Managing Director / Publishing Editor – 1 hour 
(first visit), 1 hour (second visit) 
Sales Director – 1 hour 
Dickens Dickens is renowned in the industry for its ability to innovatively rebrand and repackage celebrated 
works as well as commission authors to write works of non-fiction.  
Managing director – 1 hour 
Eliot Eliot is the youngest of the firms in our study, but has expanded rapidly since achieving early successes 
with fiction, non-fiction and children’s titles.  
Managing Director / Publishing Editor – 1 hour 
Gaskell Gaskell represents the successful amalgamation of several smaller publishing houses, specialising in 
literary fiction and upmarket non-fiction, 
Managing Director / Publishing Editor – 1 hour 
Hardy Collaborative partner of Brontë; a small publishing offshoot of a larger media group that outsources 
the production processes (printing, warehousing, distribution) of its trade publishing to Brontë. 
Relationship Manager, Publishing – 1 hour (first 
visit), 20 mins (second visit) 
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Other Alliance 
Partners 
Type of Firm Interviewees and Duration of Interview 
Suppliers Graphic design company 
Printing company 
Warehousing & distribution company 
Specialist sales organisation 
Art Director – ¾ hour 
Managing Director – 1 hour 
Managing Director - ¾ hour 
Managing Director – 1 hour 
Customers National Bookseller 1 
National Bookseller 2 
Head Office Buyer – ¾ hour 
Head Office Buyer – 1 hour 
Other  Trade Association Body Executive  Board Member – 1 ½ hours 
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Appendix 2 – Evidence of relational contracting in related alliances 
Co-opetitive Alliance  Alliance Risks Formal and Relational Contracting 
Printing alliance (horizontal 
activity between Austen, 
Carroll, Dickens) – involves the 
consolidation of the total 
number of printing suppliers to 
members of the alliance and the 
pooling of printing volumes to 
obtain economies of scale.  Each 
member of the alliance enters 
into separate contracts with the 
selected suppliers.  The 
objective of group purchasing of 
printing services is to enhance 
purchasing power and access 
economies of scale. 
Misappropriation of proprietary information by partners, e.g. the 
format and presentation of each book  
“In an ideal world, you would never ever reveal to a competitor 
any information about your pipeline, or your preferred terms of 
trade or whatever…but we have no choice…if you want, need, to 
reduce your printing costs, then you have to put your cards on 
the table along with everyone else.” (Managing Director, 
Austen) 
Opportunistic behaviour, e.g. if a member to the alliance should 
move to another printer it would expose their partners to potential 
breach of contract  
“[I]f you agree a certain level of volumes [with printers] and you 
can’t meet them…the risk is that you’ll have to carry the 
additional costs…or [lose] the discounts that you agreed with 
the printer on the basis of higher volumes.” (Managing Director, 
Austen) 
Homogeneity of product offering, e.g. from firms sharing 
production pipeline information and also from adopting similar 
book formats as a smaller number of suppliers limits printing 
choice. 
Perceived or actual anti-competitive behaviour in group dealings 
with printers 
Formals contracts to manage the vertical relationship between each 
firm and the printer (each firm in the alliance enters into a separate 
contract with each printer) 
The firms have an informal agreement to pool printing volumes. 
Shared values, derived from prior relationships, help to select partners 
with a similar commitment to the alliance and its objectives. Risks 
associated with misappropriation and opportunism are further 
mitigated through, e.g. self-regulating behaviour and monitoring. 
“The feedback loops are strong because it would be known very, 
very quickly if somebody had used a printer outside of the agreement 
…first of all I would be surprised if anyone did it in secret and 
second, if they did it would get to be known very quickly.” 
(Managing Director, Brontë) 
Self-regulating behaviours are reinforced by the ‘shadow of the future’ 
in that firms have the potential to achieve significant reductions in 
printing costs if they remain in the alliance and risk exclusion if they 
go against group norms.  
The flexible nature of the arrangement between firms ensures that 
partners can each agree a contract with the printer that meets their 
specific requirements. 
“You might say ‘well, we had to use [another printer] because we 
couldn’t get our reprinting in time.’” (Managing Director, Brontë) 
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Third party production (vertical 
activity between Hardy and 
Brontë) – involves Hardy 
outsourcing its production 
processes to Brontë.  The 
collaboration provides Hardy 
with access to resources. 
Misappropriation of proprietary information by Brontë, e.g. Hardy 
provides advance information as to the format and presentation of 
each book in their pipeline. 
“You’re trying to protect, your ideas, your content, your 
intellectual property…[I]t’s a risk that you’re exposed to.” 
(Relationship Manager, Hardy) 
Opportunistic behaviour, e.g. the delay of the production process 
by Brontë. 
“Delaying publication…[is] obviously something that a partner 
could do in publishing.” (Relationship Manager, Hardy) 
Homogeneity e.g. from Brontë unwittingly adopting aspects of 
Hardy’s product offering or exerting influence on Hardy’s 
production choices 
A formal Heads of Agreement establishes a general agreement 
between the firms to work together. The type and amount of activity 
that Brontë will undertake on Hardy’s behalf is agreed informally 
(relational contract). 
“It was defined in a Heads of Agreement between the two 
companies. There was never really any sort of guarantee that either 
of us would have first option, but the spirit of the agreement was that 
we would give Brontë all the work that we could on all the projects 
that we work on.” (Relationship Manager, Hardy) 
The Heads of Agreement gives both firms flexibility in relation to the 
extent of its involvement in the collaboration, thus reducing the risk of 
undesirable behaviours from a partner that is forced to remain in an 
unprofitable or unsuitable alliance.  
Risks are mitigated largely through self-regulating behaviours by 
Brontë in the knowledge that any misappropriation or opportunism 
will be conveyed to other competitors, potentially inhibiting its ability 
to engage in future collaborative activities. Brontë acknowledges the 
influence of the ‘shadow of the future’ in its behaviours. 
“Immediately we sent a signal to the rest of the trade that we were 
around for a while, and that if [Hardy] could trust us then so should 
you.” (Managing Director, Brontë) 
Shared values, e.g. around the importance of maintaining the 
uniqueness of each firm, are identical to those expressed in the sales 
alliance. They serve to promote desirable behaviours as well as remind 
the partners of the risk of homogeneity associated with this alliance. 
“The underlying ethos is that it’s about the quality of what we do, 
it’s really the most important thing…Keeping the integrity in the 
brand is very important.” (Relationship Manager, Hardy) 
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Figure 1 – Co-opetitive Alliances Studied 
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Table 1 – A Framework for Investigating Relational Contracting 
Mechanisms Work by Sustained by Outcomes  
Shared values 
Alliance meetings and 
other informal and social 
gatherings 
Group norms (codes of 
conduct, implicit 
understandings) 
Restricted access to the 
alliance 
Involvement restricted to 
senior personnel 
Threat of collective 
sanctions 
 
Enabling firms to 
demonstrate commitment 
to the alliance and to 
partners 
Building a sense of 
solidarity and shared 
vision 
Facilitating the exchange 
of information about 
activities and about the 
relationships between 
partners 
Providing firms with the 
means to monitor their 
partners 
Indicating to firms and 
potential partners the 
implicit rules and 
sanctions that underpin 
the relationship 
Diffusing information 
about partners’ 
reputations 
Facilitating partner 
selection 
Prior and repeated 
exchanges between 
partners  
Social ties between 
partners 
Self-regulating behaviour 
(including restraint from 
use of power) 
Enlightened self-
interest/shadow of the 
future 
Flexibility 
 
Informal agreements / 
credible commitments 
made by each partner 
 
 
 
 
 
